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COMMENTS ON THE PENDING
BANKRUPTCY REFORM
Dan Schechter*
The 106th Congress will soon address the issue of bankruptcy
reform, left unfinished by the 105th Congress. The House' and Sen-
ate bills2 of 1998 resulted in a Conference Report published in Octo-
ber, 1998,3 which will probably serve as a starting-point for legisla-
tion during 1999 and 2000.
4
This Article assumes that some sort of bankruptcy reform will
pass, whether bankruptcy practitioners like it or not. Thus, instead of
raging against the coming darkness, it will suggest a series of work-
able legislative compromises that should make a Presidential veto
less likely and will make it easier for practitioners and the courts to
implement the proposed reforms.
This Article does not pretend to be a comprehensive discussion
of the problems presented by the Conference Report, a document
more than 50,000 words long. Instead, it will focus on a few of the
more crucial issues, beginning with the "needs-based" bankruptcy
proposal and its effect on Chapter 13 administration. Sections I
through IV of this Article propose alternatives to the current legisla-
tion. Section I discusses solutions to "needs-based" bankruptcy.
Section II describes incentives for trustees and attorneys to accom-
plish a successful Chapter 13 plan. Section III states that Chapter 13
debtors should be rewarded for completion of a plan. Section IV ex-
plains how current "anti-cramdown" provisions are overbroad.
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, California. The
author would like to thank Maureen Tighe, United States Trustee for the Cen-
tral District of California, and Jill Sturtevant, Esq., for their invaluable com-
ments on earlier drafts of portions of this article.
1. H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. (1998).
2. S. 1301, 105th Cong. (1998).
3. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 105-794 (1998).
4. This article assumes the reader has a copy of the Conference Report on
hand.
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Sections V through VII propose changes to the Bankruptcy Code.
Section V asserts that assets in "Asset Protection Trusts" should be
property of the estate. Section VI discusses the "Homestead Cap."
Section VII examines the Chapter 7 estate's rights to the debtor's
capital gains exclusion. Sections VIII and IX suggest the redrafting
of two portions of the Conference Report. Section VIII critiques the
audit procedures, and Section IX critiques the notice provision in
Section 603. Finally, Sections X and XI defend a few provisions
currently contained in the Conference Report, in the hope that those
provisions will survive the coming legislative battle. Section X de-
fends the "Installment Redemptions" proposal, and Section XI de-
fends the provisions to discourage bad faith repeat filings.
I. THE "GATEKEEPER/POOL" SOLUTION TO "NEEDS-BASED"
BANKRUPTCY: ENCOURAGING TRUSTEES TO INVESTIGATE DEBTORS
WHO SHOULD NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF CHAPTER 7
A. "Needs-Based" Access to Bankruptcy: When Do the Means
Justify the End?
Supposedly, the British playwright George Bernard Shaw was
seated next to a pompous lady at a dinner party. Idly, he asked her,
"Would you spend the night with me for a million pounds?" She
pondered his rhetorical question and said that yes, she probably
would.5
He followed up: "Would you do so for five pounds?" She was
shocked: "What kind of a woman you think I am?" Shaw mur-
mured, "We've already established what you are, madam; we're
merely haggling over the price."
In a slightly less risque vein, everyone would agree that a wast-
rel with a very high income and very large credit card debts should
not be permitted simply to declare bankruptcy under Chapter 7 and
walk away from debts, but should be forced to pay off creditors over
time in a Chapter 13 plan.6 Everyone would also agree that a
5. This has been called a "familiar but possibly apocryphal story." lain
Johnstone, GBS on One Hand, THE TIMES (LONDON), May 13, 1990.
6. To oversimplify, Chapter 7 provides for liquidation of the debtor's as-
sets and the discharge of the debtor's obligations under 11 U.S.C. § 727;
Chapter 13 provides for the filing of a plan for the payment over time of all or
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moderate-income family that had incurred crushing medical bills
should be permitted to file Chapter 7 to obtain a fresh start, instead of
being forced into Chapter 13.
In other words, everyone would agree that at some level, access
to Chapter 7 should be "needs-based" or "means-tested." But now
we must haggle over the price.
B. The Current Proposal: Every Debtor with a Net Monthly Income
of $83.33 Is Forced into Chapter 13
In sections 101 and 102 of the Conference Report,7 a Chapter 7
filing would be "abusive" if the debtor's net monthly income exceeds
$83.33 per month, or if his net income could fund a Chapter 13 re-
payment plan that would pay off 25% of his unsecured debts over
five years. 8 In other words, even if the debtor could not fund a 25%
repayment plan, he would be forced into Chapter 13 if his net
monthly income exceeds $83.33. Net income would be defined as
gross income reduced by payments on secured debt, payments on
priority debts, such as alimony and child support, and payments to
meet the debtor's necessary expenses, defined by standards issued by
the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS").9 The trustee in bankruptcy
appointed by the court would be required to review the debtor's fi-
nancial records and to move to dismiss any "abusive" Chapter 7 fil-
ings. 10 In order to escape dismissal, the burden of proof would be on
the debtor to show "extraordinary circumstances."'I
Judge Eugene Wedoff of Chicago, in materials prepared for the
American Bankruptcy Institute, explained the effect of that proposal:
"For example, a debtor with medical bills totaling $200,000 and dis-
posable income (under the formula) of $90 per month, would be
found to have made an abusive Chapter 7 filing, even though less
than 3% of the unsecured debt could be paid in a five-year Chapter
13 plan."'
12
part of the debtor's assets under 11 U.S.C. § 1322.
7. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-794, at 4-8 (1998).
8. See id. at 5.
9. See id.
10. See id. at 7.
11. Id. at5.
12. Hon. Eugene Wedoff, Conference Report on H.R. 3150-Major Con-
sumer Provisions, (visited Apr. 10, 1999) <http://www.abiworld.org/legis/
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C. Problems: Harsh, Impractical, Muddy, Rigid, and Underfunded
Aside from the fact that the President has promised to veto any
bill containing any such provision, there are several other problems
with that proposal:
First, it sets the bar far too low, sweeping in thousands of fami-
lies with modest incomes and forcing them to pay off their debts in
protracted and burdensome Chapter 13 plans, rather than obtaining a
fresh start.
Second, overinclusion is not only harsh, it is also impractical.
Many people forced into Chapter 13 will seek permission from the
bankruptcy courts to escape back into Chapter 7, where they belong,
and the courts will be overwhelmed with those motions.
Third, beyond the sheer number of "escape" motions, the courts
will be burdened by the muddy and imprecise IRS standards con-
tained in the congressional formula. Imprecise standards are not
only difficult to administer, they also encourage litigation, since they
do not lead to predictable results.
Fourth, two-thirds of all current Chapter 13 plans fail and are
converted to Chapter 7, even though the debtors have voluntarily
chosen Chapter 13.13 Forcing marginal debtors into Chapter 13 will
greatly increase the failure rate, at great expense to all involved.
Fifth, the "gatekeepers" charged with administering the new rule
are the trustees in bankruptcy, who are already underpaid, receiving
approximately $60 for each "no asset" case that they handle.
14
Adding an extra burden to their load will ensure that the job will not
get done.
D. A Solution: Fair, Practical, Clear, Appropriate, andAdequately-
Funded
The solution is obvious in principle but difficult to define: The
bar should be set at a realistic level. The "$83 in net income" test is
simply too low. A successful Chapter 13 repayment plan depends
upon the availability of discretionary income to pay off a percentage
of the old debts, while the debtor tries to rebuild his life. A person
bills/confreportanal 10-9-98.html>.
13. See Henry J. Sommer, Causes of the Consumer Bankruptcy Explosion:
Debtor Abuse or Easy Credit?, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 33, 46 (1998).
14. See 11 U.S.C. § 330(b) (1994).
980
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with $83 in net income who is shackled to a repayment plan will not
be able to make a fresh start.
Rather than using an arbitrary, and wrong, "$83 in net income"
test, is there a more principled way to choose the cutoff point? In
statistics, there is a concept called "standard deviation," a measure of
the spread of the familiar bell-shaped curve. 15 Given a normal distri-
bution, about two-thirds of any given statistical sample should be
within one standard deviation of the mean. Individuals more than
one standard deviation above or below the mean are, by definition,
out of the ordinary. Congress could require Chapter 13 plans for all
debtors whose incomes are more than one standard deviation above
the mean, thus forcing upper-income debtors into Chapter 13, while
still permitting ordinary moderate-income debtors to stay in Chapter
7.
For example, judging by the fairly crude breakdown published
in the Statistical Abstract of the United States by the Census Bureau,
it appears that, in 1995, families earning more than one standard de-
viation above the mean were those earning more than $75,000 per
year.' 6 The median income for a family of four was $49,531;1
7
"mean"' and "median" are not synonymous, but they are often re-
lated.' 8  Almost everyone would agree that families who file
15. See Palmer v. Schultz, 815 F.2d 84, 92 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1987):
The "standard deviation" is a unit of measurement that allows statisti-
cians to measure all types of disparities in common terms. Techni-
cally, a "standard deviation" is defined as "a measure of spread, dis-
persion, or variability of a group of numbers equal to the square root
of the variance of that group of numbers." The "variance" of the
group of numbers is computed by subtracting the "mean," or average,
of all the numbers, "squaring the resulting difference, and computing
the mean of these squared differences."
Id. at 92 n.7 (citations omitted).
16. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 1997, at 469 (117th ed. 1997)[hereinafter STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT].
17. See id. at 466.
18. Mean is defined as "the average value of a set of numbers," while me-
dian is defined as "relating to or constituting a middle value in a distribution."
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, 1116, 1120 (3d ed. 1992). See also State
v. Williams, 525 N.W.2d 538, 543 (Minn. 1994) (stating that "[m]ost people
who make judgments based on statistical analysis.., will look not just to the
mean figure but also to the mode and median figures.").
June 1999]
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bankruptcy with incomes of $75,000 or more should be forced into
Chapter 13, absent extraordinary circumstances such as big medical
bills. To look at that number in another light, the average poverty
level for a family of four in 1995 was $15,569.19 The figure of
$75,000 is about five times the poverty guideline.
E. A Benchmark: Five Times the Poverty Level
For the sake of simplicity and ease of administration, I suggest
using a five-fold multiple of the most-recently published federal
poverty guideline2 0 as the benchmark for access to Chapter 7. The
federal government prepares the poverty guidelines and distributes
them widely. Most crucially, the government tailors the guidelines
to local conditions and family size and updates them every year.
The use of a crisp, clear, and reasonable benchmark tied to local
poverty standards will solve many of the problems articulated above.
It is not overinclusive, avoiding both harsh results and court conges-
tion. It is easy to administer, so that both courts and litigants can re-
solve disputes quickly; a clear standard enables litigants to predict
the outcome of litigation, avoiding many fruitless motions. It takes
account of regional differences in the cost of living and it changes
over time, unlike the current congressional formula.
The only other "fix" necessary to complete the package is some
additional compensation for Chapter 7 trustees, who will be required
to act as gatekeepers. Since their efforts will increase the number of
Chapter 13 plans and will therefore increase the payouts to the
creditors of Chapter 13 debtors, a very small percentage of those
payments should be set aside and pooled to pay for the services ren-
dered by the gatekeepers. Without additional statistical analysis of
the current Chapter 7 caseload, it is impossible to say how much ex-
tra compensation the gatekeeper should receive or what percentage
of the Chapter 13 payments should be reserved for that purpose.
That analysis should not be very difficult.
19. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 16, at 476.
20. See 45 C.F.R. pt. 1611 (1999).
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F. Start the Experiment Cautiously
Advocates of needs-based access to Chapter 7 will argue that
this Article has set the bar too high. This Article provides two re-
sponses to that argument: First, is there a principled reason to set the
benchmark elsewhere? Second, we have never tried needs-based ac-
cess to Chapter 7 before. It is therefore better to start this experiment
with the bar set too high, rather than too low. If the bar is too high, if
too few upper-income debtors are carried into Chapter 13, then Con-
gress can easily amend the legislation next year by changing the
multiplier. If, however, we start too low, then chaos will result: the
courts will be swamped with debtors seeking to escape from Chapter
13, and all other business of the bankruptcy courts will stop.
If Congress is serious about enacting bankruptcy reform next
year and avoiding a veto, it should adopt a more moderate, reasoned,
and workable approach to needs-based bankruptcy. The current pro-
posal is Procrustean, Draconian, and Dickensian.
G. Brief Summary of the Gatekeeper Process
Each debtor who files a Chapter 7 petition will be required to fill
out simple income and expense disclosure forms, backed by sup-
porting documents. The Chapter 7 trustee will conduct a confidential
review of those forms. All trustees who conduct that review will be
entitled to an extra fee of $5, to be paid from a pool funded by a
modest increase in filing fees.
The trustee will first determine and verify whether the debtor's
income is at least five times the applicable federal poverty level. If
not, the trustee's duty to conduct a review ends at that point, al-
though the trustee may investigate further. If, however, the income
is above that level, the trustee must determine whether the debtor's
projected disposable income is sufficient to pay off twenty percent of
his unsecured nonpriority debts over a five-year period. If it is, the
Chapter 7 trustee will file a simple § 707(b) 21 motion to dismiss the
21. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1994). Section 707(b) provides, in pertinent part,
that
[a]fter notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion or on a mo-
tion by the United States trustee... may dismiss a case filed by an in-
dividual debtor under this chapter whose debts are primarily consumer
debts if it finds that the granting of relief would be a substantial abuse
June 1999]
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Chapter 7. The debtor can then oppose the motion, dismiss the
Chapter 7, or pursue another alternative, such as Chapter 13.
If the debtor voluntarily dismisses the Chapter 7, or if the court
grants the trustee's motion, the trustee will be entitled to additional
compensation, up to a maximum of $50. That compensation will be
paid from a pool funded by a retention from Chapter 13 distributions
on unsecured claims. The opportunity to earn that extra gatekeeper
fee in some, but not all, cases will encourage trustees to conduct a
careful income review in every Chapter 7, to see whether the debtor
is really qualified for Chapter 7.
In addition, creditors will have standing to bring their own §
707(b) motions, and they will be compensated in the same way.
H. Suggested Legislation Implementing the Gatekeeper Proposal
1. The Chapter 7 trustee's gatekeeping duties
TRUSTEE'S DUTIES - Section 704 of title 11, United States
Code, is amended as follows:
(A) by striking "and" at the end of paragraph (8);
(B) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (9) and
inserting "; and"; and
(C) by adding at the end the following:
"(10) with respect to an individual debtor filing a petition
under Chapter 7,
(a) review all materials provided by the debtor under
section 521,
(b) investigate and verify the debtor's projected dispos-
able income,
(c) determine and report whether the debtor's income is
at least five times the most-recently published poverty
level applicable to the debtor's location and household
or family size, in conformity with the definitions con-
tained in the poverty guidelines updated annually in the
Federal Register by the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services under authority of section 673(2) of
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981,
of the provisions of this chapter.
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(d) if so, determine whether the debtor's projected dis-
posable income, as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2),
would be sufficient to fund a Chapter 13 plan that
would repay at least 20% of the debtor's scheduled un-
secured, nonpriority debts over a five-year period fol-
lowing the confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan, and
(e) if so, file a motion under § 707(b) to dismiss the
debtor's Chapter 7 petition."
DISMISSAL OF CHAPTER 7 PETITION FOR
SUBSTANTIAL ABUSE - Section 707(b), title 11, United States
Code, is amended to read as follows:
"(b)(1) After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own
motion or on the motion of the United States Trustee or any
party in interest, may dismiss a case filed by an individual
debtor under this chapter if, given the totality of the circum-
stances of the debtor's financial situation, it finds that the
granting of relief would be a substantial abuse of the provi-
sions of this chapter. Grounds for dismissal include (but
are not limited to) those provided by paragraph (2)(a) of
this subsection.
(2) For purposes of subsection (b) of this section
(A) A petition filed under this chapter shall be deemed
to be in substantial abuse of the provisions of this
chapter if the court finds that
(i) the debtor's income is at least five times the
most-recently published poverty level applicable
to the debtor's location and household or family
size, in conformity with the definitions contained
in the poverty guidelines updated annually in the
Federal Register by the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services under authority of section
673(2) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1981; and
(ii) the debtor's projected disposable income, as
defined by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2), would be suf-
ficient to fund a Chapter 13 plan that would repay
at least 20% of the debtor's scheduled unsecured,
June 1999]
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nonpriority debts over a five-year period following
the confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan.
(B) If the debtor opposes a motion that is based in
whole or in part on the grounds set out in paragraph
(2)(A) of this subsection, the debtor may introduce evi-
dence of extraordinary circumstances or expenses to
show the debtor's inability to fund such a plan.
(C) If a party in interest, including a trustee appointed
under this title or the United States Trustee, files a mo-
tion under this subsection and the case is subsequently
dismissed or converted to another chapter, either vol-
untarily or involuntarily, the court shall award to such
party in interest its fees and costs, not to exceed the
sum of $50, which shall be paid immediately from the
fund established pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 707(c)."
2. The forms to be filed by the debtor
DEBTOR'S DUTIES - Section 521 of title 11, United States
Code, is amended as follows:
(1) by inserting "(a)" before "The debtor shall -
(2) by striking paragraph (1) and inserting the following:
"(1) file under penalty of perjury and to the best of the
debtor's knowledge and belief
(A) a list of all creditors, including those from whom
the debtor expects to receive any regular monthly bills
for goods or services received before the filing of the
petition; and
(B) unless the court orders otherwise -
(i) a schedule of assets and liabilities;
(ii) a schedule of current income and current ex-
penses, which for petitions involving individual
debtors must include all household income and all
household expenses;
(iii) a statement of the debtor's financial affairs,
including
986
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(I) for petitions involving individual debtors,
the employment history for debtor and
debtor's spouse during the past five years, and
a statement disclosing any changes in em-
ployment, income, or expenses reasonably
anticipated during the 12-month period fol-
lowing the date of filing;
(II) for petitions involving non-individual
debtors, an explanation of the reasons for fil-
ing the petition, any significant changes in
business operations during the past six
months, and financial statements for the past
two years;
(iv) for petitions involving -individual debtors, a
certificate
(I) of an attorney whose name is on the peti-
tion as the attorney for the debtor or any bank-
ruptcy petition preparer signing the petition
pursuant to section 11O(b)(1) indicating that
such attorney or bankruptcy petition preparer
delivered to the debtor any notice required by
section 342(b) of this title; or
(II) of the debtor that such a notice was ob-
tained and read by the debtor if no attorney
for the debtor is indicated and no petition pre-
parer signed the petition;
(v) for petitions involving individual debtors, ei-
ther a Chapter 13 plan or an alternative statement
containing sufficient information to show whether
the debtor's projected disposable income, as de-
fined by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2), would be suffi-
cient to fund a Chapter 13 plan that would repay at
least 20% of the debtor's scheduled unsecured,
nonpriority debts over a five-year period following
the confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan."
(3) by inserting "(A)" after "(4)" in paragraph (4), and
adding at the end the following:
June 1999]
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"(B) in the case of an individual debtor, provide to the
trustee at the meeting required under section 341(a) of this
title the following:
(i) copies of any federal or state tax returns, including
any schedules or attachments, filed by the debtor for
the 3-year period preceding the filing of the petition;
(ii) copies of all payment advices or other evidence of
payment, if any, received by the debtor or debtor's
spouse from any employer in the 60-day period pre-
ceding the filing of the petition; and
(iii) copies of any court orders requiring debtor or
debtor's spouse to pay child or spousal support, or
court orders awarding payment of child or spousal sup-
port to debtor or debtor's spouse; and
(iv) if requested by the trustee, proof of debtor's iden-
tity, social security number, residential address, and
marital status.
(C) in the case of an individual debtor, provide to the trus-
tee within 30 days of the trustee's written request the fol-
lowing:
(i) copies of documents relating to debtor's interest in
any property claimed as exempt on the schedules filed
with the court, including copies of any notes, deeds, or
other evidence of title or liens affecting real or personal
property, or documents relating to the debtor's interest
in any retirement accounts or pension plans;
(ii) documents evidencing debtor's household income
or expenses;"
(4) by replacing "(5)" in paragraph (5) with "(6)," and by
adding new "(5)" as follows:
"(5) in a case of an individual debtor under Chapter 7, 12,
or 13, provide to the trustee
(A) at the time filed with the taxing authority, all tax
returns, including any schedules or attachments, with
respect to the period from the commencement of the
case until such time as the case is closed;
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(B) at the time filed with the taxing authority, all tax
returns, including any schedules or attachments, that
were not filed with the taxing authority before the first
meeting under section 341(a) with respect to the three-
year period before the filing of the petition;
(C) any amendments to any of the tax returns, includ-
ing schedules or attachments, described in paragraph
(A) or (B);
(D) in a case under Chapter 12 or 13 only, for each tax
year following confirmation of the plan until the case is
closed, a statement under penalty of perjury by the
debtor as to the debtor's monthly income and expenses,
which shall disclose
(i) the amount and sources of total household in-
come of the debtor;
(ii) the identity of any persons responsible with the
debtor for the support of any dependents of the
debtor; and
(iii) the identity of any persons who contributed,
and the amount contributed, to the household in
which the debtor resides."
3. Funding
FUND FOR PAYMENT OF "GATEKEEPER"
INVESTIGATORY FEES - Section 1930, title 28, United States
Code, is amended as follows:
(1) by striking "$130" in subsection (a)(1) and inserting
"$135;"
(2) in subsection (e), by inserting "(1)" after "(e)";
(3) by adding at the end the following:
"(2) From each fee paid to the clerk pursuant to subsection
(a)(1) of this section, the clerk shall segregate the sum of
$5, to be deposited by the clerk in a separate account main-
tained solely for the payment of fees awarded to the trustee
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 326(a)(2)."
In addition, Section 326(a), title 28, United States Code, is
amended as follows:
June 1999] 989
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(1) by inserting "(1)" after "(a)";
(2) by adding at the end the following:
"(2) In a case under Chapter 7 filed by an individual debtor,
the court shall award the trustee an extra fee of $5 from the
fund established under 28 U.S.C. § 1930(e)(2), after the
trustee has certified that the trustee has completed the in-
vestigation required by section 704(10) of this title."
FUND FOR PAYMENT OF "GATEKEEPER" FEES FOR
SUCCESSFUL PROSECUTION OF SECTION 707(b) MOTIONS -
Section 707, title 11, United States Code, is amended by adding at
the end the following:
"(c) There is hereby established in the Treasury of the
United States a special fund to be known as the "11 U.S.C.
§ 707(c) Fund" ("the Fund"). Monies in the Fund shall be
available to the bankruptcy courts in order to pay the fees
authorized under section 707(b), and for no other purpose.
The United States Trustee shall transmit to the Congress,
not later than 120 days after the end of each fiscal year, a
detailed report on the amounts deposited in the Fund and a
description of expenditures made under this section."
In addition, Section 1322(a), title 11, United States Code, is
amended as follows:
(1) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (3) and adding
"; and"; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
"(4) provide for the retention by the trustee of money equal
to one-tenth of one percent of each payment on an unse-
cured claim scheduled to be made under the plan, to be paid
quarterly by the trustee into the Fund established pursuant
to 11 U.S.C. § 707(c)."
II. CHAPTER 13 TRUSTEES AND ATTORNEYS SHOULD HAVE AN
INCENTIVE TO CONFIRM AND CONSUMMATE A SUCCESSFUL PLAN
A. Description of Incentives
The gatekeeper approach suggested above should result in a
substantial increase in the number of Chapter 13 filings. All
BANKRUPTCYLEGISLATION
participants in the bankruptcy system have a strong interest in the
success of Chapter 13 plans, and the system should therefore encour-
age active monitoring by the "shepherds," the Chapter 13 trustee and
the debtor's attorney.
Various provisions of the pending bills will also add substan-
tially to the administrative tasks performed by Chapter 13 trustees
and their attorneys. In order to provide an incentive to the trustees to
perform those tasks and to actively assist the progress of the Chapter
13 plan on an ongoing basis, Chapter 13 trustees should receive an
additional bonus at the end of a successful Chapter 13 plan. Simi-
larly, attorneys for Chapter 13 debtors should get a comparable in-
centive to remain closely involved with the Chapter 13 case until it is
successfully completed. Both of these incentive payments should be
paid out of a national pool funded by a retention from Chapter 13
distributions on unsecured claims.
By the same token, it may be counterproductive to impose harsh
sanctions and onerous investigatory duties on Chapter 13 attorneys,
as now provided in some parts of the currently-pending legislation,
such as in section 102(b)(2)(iii) of the Conference Report.22 Those
disincentives will only serve to drive Chapter 13 attorneys out of the
system, leaving pro se debtors to fend for themselves, at great ex-
pense to the courts and the creditors. Under current law, the courts
are plagued with incompetent filings by pro se debtors, often "as-
sisted" by non-lawyer "bankruptcy petition preparers" who provide
debtors with bad advice and outdated, inaccurate, and incomplete
forms. Penalizing Chapter 13 attorneys, instead of rewarding them
for competent work, will only exacerbate this problem.
22. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 105-794, at 6-7 (1998). Section 102(b)(2)(iii)
adds language that requires an attorney to perform a reasonable investigation
into the circumstances that gave rise to the bankruptcy petition and to deter-
mine if the petition is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or
a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law. If the court finds that the attorney failed to do so, the court may assess a
civil penalty against the attorney. See id. at 7.
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B. Suggested Legislation Providing Appropriate Incentives to
Chapter 13 Trustees and Attorneys
INCENTIVE PAYMENTS TO CHAPTER 13 TRUSTEES
AND ATTORNEYS - Section 326(b), title 11, United States Code, is
amended as follows:
(1) by inserting "(1)" after "(b)";
(2) by adding at the end the following:
"(2) If a trustee appointed under section 1302(a) has pro-
vided exemplary services throughout a Chapter 13 plan that
is successfully completed, the court in its discretion may
award bonus compensation, not to exceed an additional one
percent of all payments made on unsecured claims under
the plan, to be paid from the fund established under section
1322(f) of this title."
In addition, Section 330(a)(4)(B), title 11, United States Code, is
amended as follows:
(1) by inserting "(i)" after "(B)"; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
"(ii) If the debtor's attorney in a Chapter 13 case in which
the debtor is an individual has provided exemplary services
throughout a Chapter 13 plan that is successfully com-
pleted, the court in its discretion may award bonus compen-
sation, not to exceed an additional one percent of all pay-
ments on unsecured claims made under the plan, to be paid
from the fund established under section 1322(f) of this ti-
tle."
FUND FOR INCENTIVE PAYMENTS TO CHAPTER 13
TRUSTEES AND ATTORNEYS - Section 1322(a), title 11, United
States Code, is amended as follows:
(1) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (3) and adding
"; and"; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
"(4) provide for the retention by the trustee of money equal
to 1% of the total payments on unsecured claims scheduled
to be made under the plan, which shall be paid quarterly by
the trustee into the Fund established pursuant to subsection
(f) of this section."
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In addition, Section 1322, title 11, United States Code, is
amended by adding at the end the following:
"(f) There is hereby established in the Treasury of the
United States a special fund to be known as the "Chapter 13
Incentive Payments Fund" ("the Fund"), to be maintained
in a separate interest-bearing account. Monies in the Fund
shall be available to the bankruptcy courts in order to pay
the fees authorized under sections 326(b)(2) and
330(a)(4)(B)(ii) of this title, and for no other purpose. The
United States Trustee shall transmit to the Congress, not
later than 120 days after the end of each fiscal year, a de-
tailed report on the amounts deposited in the Fund and a de-
scription of expenditures made under this section."
III. DEBTORS WHO SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETE CHAPTER 13 PLANS
SHOULD BE REWARDED BY ENHANCEMENT OF THEIR CREDIT
REPORTS
A. Description of Proposal
Currently, the filing of a bankruptcy petition by a debtor is re-
flected on the debtor's credit report. That should not change, but
debtors who successfully complete Chapter 13 plans should have that
fact reflected on their credit reports. That will provide some incen-
tive for debtors to complete their Chapter 13 plans. However, no
reference to the debtor's bankruptcy, whether resulting in a success-
ful Chapter 13 plan or not, should remain on the debtor's credit re-
port for more than seven years after the filing of a petition.
B. Suggested Legislation to Enhance Credit Reports of Successful
Chapter 13 Debtors
ENHANCEMENT OF CREDIT REPORTS OF SUCCESSFUL
CHAPTER 13 DEBTORS - Section 1681c(d), title 15, is amended
by adding the following:
"If (i) any case arising under Chapter 13 of title 11 has re-
sulted in a successfully completed plan and (ii) the debtor
provides the consumer reporting agency with documenta-
tion certifying successful completion, the consumer report-
ing agency shall include in the report a statement that the
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Chapter 13 plan was successfully completed; provided,
however, that any such report of successful completion
must be deleted from the report within the time period gov-
erning the deletion of the report of the initial filing of the
petition under title 11."
CERTIFICATE OF SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF
CHAPTER 13 PLAN - Section 1328, title 11, is amended to add the
following:
"(f) Upon successful completion of all payments under the
plan, and upon request by the debtor, the trustee shall pre-
pare, for the court's signature, a certificate of successful
completion. A certified copy of that certificate may be pre-
sented by the debtor to any consumer credit reporting
agency pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(d)."
IV. THE CURRENT "ANTI-CRAMDoWN" PROVISIONS ARE OVERBROAD
A. Chapter 13 Should Remain More Attractive to Debtors than
Chapter 7, but Broad "Anti-Cramdown" Provisions Are
Counterproductive
If Chapter 13 becomes too burdensome, higher-income debtors
will more strongly resist the gatekeepers' efforts to dismiss their
Chapter 7 petitions. Also, provisions that make it harder to confirm
Chapter 13 plans are counterproductive: failed Chapter 13 plans will
convert to Chapter 7 liquidations. Some provisions in the current
legislation may make many Chapter 13 plans unconfirmable or unat-
tractive.
Sections 124 and 125 of the Conference Report,23 the current
"anti-cramdown" provisions, are so onerous that they may imperil
the Chapter 13 process, to no one's advantage. For example, section
124 provides that if the secured party holds a purchase money secu-
rity interest created within five years of the debtor's bankruptcy
filing, the debtor must pay off the debt in full. 24 That is an impossi-
ble task that will defeat many, if not most, Chapter 13 plans. Unlike
the current Bankruptcy Code, it will require full payment to creditors
23. See id. at 24-25.
24. See id.
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who hold minimal collateral and will protect "sub-prime" lenders at
the expense of other creditors.25
Some creditors, such as automobile lenders and lessors, argua-
bly should be protected by the anti-cramdown provision, because
some Chapter 13 debtors purchase automobiles shortly before filing
bankruptcy and then "cramdown" their lenders. However, a nar-
rowly-crafted motor vehicle anti-cramdown rule should be sufficient
to protect automobile lenders. As a matter of cold reality, any reform
bill will have to protect the politically-powerful automobile finance
lobby; but there is no reason to benefit all secured lenders at the ex-
pense of all unsecured creditors.
B. Suggested "Automobile Anti-Cramdown" Legislation
GIVING MOTOR VEHICLE FINANCIERS AND LESSORS
FAIR TREATMENT IN CHAPTER 13 - Section 1325(a) of title 11,
United States Code, is amended as follows:
(A) Paragraph (a)(6) is amended by striking "(6)" and inserting
"(7);" and
(B) Paragraph (a)(6) is added as follows:
"(6) with respect to each allowed claim provided for by the
plan that is secured solely by a lease of or a security interest
in the debtor's motor vehicle purchased or leased within
180 days of the filing of the petition,
(A) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan;
(B) the plan provides (i) that the holder of such claim
retain the lien or property interest securing such claim
until the payment of the underlying debt determined
under nonbankruptcy law, and (ii) that if the case under
this chapter is dismissed or converted without comple-
tion of the plan, such lien or property interest shall also
be retained by such holder to the extent recognized by
applicable nonbankruptcy law; or
(C) the debtor surrenders the property to such holder;
and"
25. See id.
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V. ASSETS MAINTAINED IN "ASSET PROTECTION TRUSTS" SHOULD
BE PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE
A. Description of Proposal
Some higher-income debtors have hidden some of their assets in
"asset protection trusts" in an effort to shield those assets from
creditors and from the trustee in bankruptcy.26 Those trusts are set
up so that the settlor and the beneficiary are the same entity.27 The
Bankruptcy Code should be amended to make it clear that those as-
sets are property of the estate and that the trustee has the right to seek
recovery from those trusts, except for certain qualified pension or re-
tirement trusts.
The proposed legislation (1) defines asset protection trusts, (2)
invalidates restrictions on alienation in such trusts, and (3) denies a
discharge to debtors who fail to turn over their property in such trusts
to the trustee in bankruptcy.
B. Suggested Legislation Providing that Assets in Asset Protection
Trusts Are Property of the Estate
ASSETS IN "ASSET PROTECTION TRUSTS" ARE
PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE - First, Section 101, title 11, United
States Code, is amended by adding subsection (3) as follows:
"(3) "asset protection trust" means a trust governed by non-
bankruptcy law, including foreign law, in which a settlor
and a beneficiary of that trust are the same entity, but does
not include any pension, profit-sharing, annuity, or similar
retirement plan or arrangement (i) subject to the applicable
provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Savings Act
of 1974, or (ii) an Individual Retirement Account, to the
extent protected by state law."
Second, Section 541(c)(2) of title 11, United States Code, is
amended by inserting ", other than an asset protection trust," before
26. See Norman H. Glickman, Asset Protection Trusts and International
Estate Planning, in ESTATE PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION 1993, at 585,
619 (PLI Tax L. & Est. Planning Course Handbook Series No. 228, 1993);
Lynn M. Lopucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 32-3 8 & nn. 140-70
(1996).
27. See Lopucki, supra note 26, at 33.
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"that is enforceable under applicable non-bankruptcy law."
Third, Section 727(a) of title 11, United States Code, is amended
by adding at the end the following subsection:
"(11) the debtor failed to deliver to an officer of the estate
entitled to possession under this title any property of the
debtor held in an asset protection trust."
VI. THE $100,000 "HOMESTEAD CAP" SHOULD BE RESTORED TO THE
LEGISLATION
Earlier House drafts of the legislation contained a $100,000
limitation on the homestead exemption,28 but that provision was un-
fortunately deleted in the most recent draft of the bill. Certain states,
most notably Texas and Florida, have very liberal rules regarding
homestead exemptions.29  Wealthy debtors, well-aware of those
loopholes, have often come from other states to purchase luxurious
mansions, especially in Florida, 30 prior to filing bankruptcy. In es-
sence, they use their homes as "safe harbors" for their wealth; after
emerging from bankruptcy, they are free to sell their homes and re-
capture that value for themselves, rather than for their creditors.
There is no reason that those debtors should get away with this
trick. The "homestead cap," which would have sharply limited that
unsavory practice, should be restored to the pending bills. Although
section 126 of the Conference Report31 includes a two-year residency
requirement, that may not be sufficient to prevent abuse. Many, and
perhaps most, of the people who currently take advantage of the un-
limited homestead exemption are very wealthy and sophisticated; a
one-year reachback will simply encourage them to begin insolvency
planning a little earlier.
28. See S. 1301, 105th Cong. § 320 (1998); H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. § 182
(1998).
29. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 280 (West 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
222.201 (West 1998).
30. See Sommer, supra note 13, at 51 & nn.140-43.
31. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-794, at 25 (1998).
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VII. THE CHAPTER 7 ESTATE SHOULD SUCCEED TO THE DEBTOR'S
RIGHT TO EXCLUDE CAPITAL GAINS ON THE SALE OF A RESIDENCE
A. Description of Proposal
Under current law, the trustee may or may not be able to suc-
ceed to the debtor's right to exclude from income taxation the capital
gains realized on the sale of a personal residence. The cases on point
are in conflict. For example, the court in In re Barden32 construed §
1398 and held that the trustee did not succeed to the debtor's rights
under § 121, the capital gains exclusion.33 At that time, however, the
capital gains exclusion applied only to senior citizens.
By contrast, the court in In re Popa34 has recently declined to
follow Barden, in part because § 121 was recently amended to apply
to taxpayers of all ages.35 In any event, the court in Popa felt that the
broad language of current § 1398 was sufficient to empower the
trustee to assert the capital gains exclusion.
36
As a result of this confusion, the trustee frequently is forced to
abandon the residence to the debtor, since the capital gains liability
outweighs any economic advantage to the creditors. In other
words, this is a de facto exemption in excess of the homestead ex-
emption: the property is returned to the debtor, who can now sell the
property and invoke the capital gains exclusion.
38
Empowering the trustee to assert the debtor's capital gains ex-
clusion would not result in any reduction of revenue to the IRS in
most, and perhaps all, cases. As matters now stand, the trustee's
abandonment means that the debtor gets the benefit of the capital
gains exclusion, and no tax revenue is generated. Transferring the
benefit of that capital gains exclusion to the trustee in bankruptcy
would not alter the net tax revenue realized by the IRS. Instead, it
would increase the bankruptcy dividend ultimately received by the
32. 205 B.R. 451 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), aft'd, 105 F.3d 821 (2d Cir. 1997).
33. See id. at 455.
34. 218 B.R. 420 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998).
35. See id. at 426.
36. See id. at 428.
37. See David M. Warren, On the Edge: Popa Disciplines the Capital Gains
Tax, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 20 (1998).
38. See Popa, 218 B.R. at 427-28.
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debtor's creditors; to the extent that those dividends generate taxable
income directly or indirectly, this proposal may even result in a slight
net increase in tax revenue.
B. Legislation Transferring Debtor's Capital Gains Exclusion to
Chapter 7 Estate
CHAPTER 7 ESTATE SUCCEEDS TO DEBTOR'S CAPITAL
GAINS EXCLUSION FOR SALE OF PERSONAL RESIDENCE -
Section 1398(f)(1), title 26, United States Code, is amended as fol-
lows:
(1) by striking the period at the end and adding a comma,
and
(2) by adding at the end the following language:
"including, without limitation, the capital gains exclusion,
if any, available to the debtor upon the sale of property
which was the debtor's primary residence pursuant to 26
U.S.C. § 121."
In addition, Section 1398(g)(6), title 26, is amended as follows:
(1) by striking the period at the end and adding a comma,
and
(2) by adding at the end the following language:
"including, without limitation, the capital gains exclusion, if
any, available to the debtor upon the sale of property which
was the debtor's primary residence pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §
121."
VIII. THE AUDIT PROCEDURES CONTAINED IN THE CONFERENCE
REPORT ARE UNREALISTICALLY BURDENSOME
A. Description of Proposal
Section 602 of the Conference Report requires the United States
Trustee to conduct audits of a certain percentage of all individual
filings, for purposes of statistical sampling and error detection.39 The
House bill also requires "audits for schedules of income and
39. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-794, at 57-58 (1998).
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expenses which reflect greater than average variances from the
statistical norm ..... 40
Taking the second requirement first, a literal reading of that lan-
guage would require half of all filings to be reviewed, since, by defi-
nition, half of them will be above-average. That is not practicable. It
may be more cost-effective to focus on those debtors most likely to
understate income and overstate expenses.
Under the gatekeeper proposal advanced above, debtors whose
incomes are at or near the benchmark level, that is, five times the ap-
plicable federal poverty guidelines, are most likely to falsify their
data, since they may wish to escape the trustee's scrutiny in order to
take advantage of Chapter 7. The United States Trustee should
therefore review the reports filed by the Chapter 7 trustees pursuant
to proposed section 704(10)(c), 41 under which the Chapter 7 trustee
is required to report the debtor's income as a percentage of the fed-
eral poverty guidelines. If the report indicates an income level more
than three times the applicable federal poverty level, the debtor will
be eligible for an audit. The United States Trustee will then ran-
domly audit five percent of those eligible. That rate is high enough
to discourage inaccurate filings without imposing an undue adminis-
trative cost.
Assume for the sake of argument that each audit will cost at
least $500. Assuming also that Congress does not intend to use gen-
eral tax revenue to pay for those audits, the only other logical source
would be bankruptcy filing fees. If the sampling technique outlined
above results in a estimated audit rate of one percent of all filings,
and if the average audit costs $500, filing fees would have to be in-
creased by $5, in addition to any increase resulting from the adoption
of the gatekeeper proposal articulated above. If the gatekeeper pro-
posals are adopted along with the audit proposals, the increases in the
fees will have to be cumulative. However, the United States Trus-
tee's percentage share will not increase at the same rate.
The current filing fee for Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 petitions is
$130 under 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(1). 42 Under current 28 U.S.C. §
589a(b)(1), the United States Trustee currently gets 23.08%, or
40. Id. at 58.
41. See id.
42. See 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(1) (1994).
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$30. 43 If filing fees are increased to $135, the United States Trus-
tee's share must be increased to 25.93% to cover the cost of the
audits.
B. Suggested Legislation for Cost-Effective, Fully-Funded Audit
Procedures
AUDIT PROCEDURES - Section 586 of title 28, United States
Code is amended as follows:
(1) by amending subsection (a)(6) to read as follows:
"(6) make such reports as the Attorney General directs, in-
eluding the results of audits performed under subsection
(f),"11;
(2) by inserting at the end the following:
"(f)(1) The Attorney General shall establish procedures for
the auditing of the accuracy and completeness of petitions,
schedules, and other information which the debtor is re-
quired to provide under sections 521 and 1322 of title 11 in
individual cases filed under Chapter 7 or 13 of such title.
Such audits shall be in accordance with generally accepted
auditing standards and performed by independent certified
public accountants or independent licensed public account-
ants. Such procedures shall
(A) establish a method of selecting appropriate quali-
fied persons to contract with the United States Trustee
to perform such audits;
(B) establish a method of randomly selecting cases to
be audited according to generally accepted audit stan-
dards, provided that no less than 1 out of every 20 eli-
gible cases in each Federal judicial district shall be se-
lected for audit;
(C) establish procedures for reporting the results of
such audits and any material misstatement of income,
expenditures or assets of a debtor to the Attorney Gen-
eral, the United States Attorney and the court, as ap-
propriate, and for providing public information no less
than annually on the aggregate results of such audits
43. See 28 U.S.C. § 589a(b)(1) (1994).
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including the percentage of cases, by district, in which
a material misstatement of income or expenditures is
reported; and
(D) establish procedures for fully funding such audits.
(2) The United States Trustee for each district is authorized
to contract with auditors to perform audits in cases desig-
nated by the United States Trustee according to the proce-
dures established under paragraph (1) of this subsection.
(3) According to procedures established under paragraph
(1), upon request of a duly appointed auditor, the debtor
shall cause the accounts, papers, documents, financial rec-
ords, files and all other papers, things or property belonging
to the debtor as the auditor requests and which are reasona-
bly necessary to facilitate an audit to be made available for
inspection and copying.
(4) The report of each such audit shall be filed with the
court, the Attorney General, and the United States Attorney,
as required under procedures established by the Attorney
General under paragraph (1). If a material misstatement of
income or expenditures or of assets is reported, a statement
specifying such misstatement shall be filed with the court
and the United States Trustee shall give notice thereof to
the creditors in the case and, in an appropriate case, in the
opinion of the United States Trustee, requires investigation
with respect to possible criminal violations, the United
States Attorney for the district.
(5) For purposes of this section, "eligible cases" shall in-
clude, without limitation, those cases in which the trustee
has filed a report pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 704(l0)(c) indi-
cating that the debtor's income is at least three times the
most recently published applicable poverty level, in con-
formity with the definitions contained in the poverty guide-
lines updated annually in the Federal Register by the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services under authority
of section 673(2) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1981."
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In addition, Section 589a, title 28, United States Code, is
amended as follows:
(1) by adding the following language to subsection (a)(5) after
the word "audits": "including, without limitation, audits required
under 11 U.S.C. § 586(f)"; and
(2) by striking "23.08" from subsection (b)(1) and inserting
"25.93."
Finally, Section 1930(a)(1), title 28, United States Code, is
amended by striking "$130" and inserting "$135."
EFFECTIVE DATE - The amendments made by this section
shall take effect 18 months after the enactment date of this Act.
IX. THE NOTICE PROVISIONS IN SECTION 603 NEED TO BE CLARIFIED
Although the substantive content of section 603 of the Confer-
ence Report, which deals with notice to creditors, 44 is sound, the lan-
guage of that section may benefit from some clarification. The fol-
lowing suggested language may accomplish that result:
SEC. 603. GIVING CREDITORS FAIR NOTICE IN
CHAPTER 7 AND 13 CASES - Section 342 of title 11, United
States Code, is amended as follows:
(1) in subsection (c) by striking ", but the failure of such notice
to contain such information shall not invalidate the legal effect of
such notice"; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
"(d) If the current account number of the debtor is stated on
either (i) the credit agreement between the debtor and the
creditor or (ii) the last communication from the creditor to
an individual debtor before the filing of a voluntary peti-
tion, then the debtor shall include that account number in
any notice to the creditor required to be given under this ti-
tle.
(e) If the creditor has given the debtor written notice before
the filing of the petition that the creditor wants to receive
correspondence regarding the debtor's account at a specific
address, then the debtor shall give all notices required by
title 11 to the creditor at that address.
44. See H.R. CoNF. REP. NO. 105-794, at 59.
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(f) At any time, a creditor, in a case of an individual debtor
under chapter 7 or 13, may file with the court and serve on
the debtor a notice of the address to be used to notify the
creditor in that case. That notice will be effective five days
after it is filed and served. Any notice given after that date
to the creditor by the court or the debtor shall be sent to that
address.
(g) Any entity may file with the court a general notice stat-
ing its address for notice in all cases under chapters 7 and
13. That notice will be effective 30 days after it is filed.
Any notice given by the court after that date to that entity in
any chapter 7 or 13 case shall be sent to that address, unless
the entity requests a different address under subsection (f)
with respect to a particular case.
(h) If a debtor or the court gives notice to a creditor without
complying with this section, that notice shall not be effec-
tive until it has been actually brought to the attention of the
creditor. If the creditor has designated a person or depart-
ment to be responsible for receiving notices concerning
bankruptcy cases and has established reasonable procedures
so that bankruptcy notices received by the creditor will be
delivered to that department or person, a notice will not be
deemed to have been brought to the attention of the creditor
until it is received by that person or department.
(i) Until a creditor has received effective notice of the
commencement of the case under this section, the court
shall not impose any sanction on that creditor under sec-
tions 362, 542, or 543 of this title on account of the credi-
tor's violation of the stay or failure to comply with those
sections."
X. THE PROPOSAL TO PROHIBIT "INSTALLMENT REDEMPTIONS" WILL
RESOLVE AMBIGUITIES AND CONFLICTS IN THE CURRENT LAW
Some courts have interpreted § 521(2)(A)45 to permit debtors to
retain collateral without either redeeming it or reaffirming the
45. 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(A) (1994).
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underlying debt.46 Instead, the debtors are permitted to make in-
stallment payments over time without reaffirmation, while still
keeping and using the collateral. Other courts have held that the
Bankruptcy Code prohibits this option.
47
To permit a debtor to retain collateral while simply making in-
stallment payments without a reaffirmation of the underlying debt
allows the debtor to force a new arrangement on the secured creditor
unilaterally. Further, the availability of this option means that few
debtors will ever elect to reaffirm secured obligations: why would a
debtor want to reaffirm, when he can get the benefit of reaffirmation,
i.e., retention of the collateral, without a long-term commitment?
If debtors have the option of "installment redemption," secured
creditors cannot obtain genuine reaffirmation agreements unless they
offer huge discounts on the underlying debt. That type of "back door
cramdown" in Chapter 7 is not what Congress had in mind when it
drafted the reaffinmation provisions of the 1978 Code. This also
serves as a disincentive to file for Chapter 13 relief. The proposed
legislation, reflected in section 121 of the Conference Report,4 8 re-
solves the ambiguity in § 521, settles the split among the circuits, and
restores a level playing field with respect to reaffirmation agree-
ments.
XI. THE PROVISIONS TO DISCOURAGE BAD FAITH REPEAT FILINGS
ARE SIMPLE, STRONG, AND EASY TO ADMINISTER
Section 120 of the Conference Report contains provisions de-
signed to address the problem of "bad faith repeat filings," which are
often undertaken in an effort to forestall real property foreclosures.
49
As a secured creditor is about to foreclose, the debtor often transfers
46. See McClellan Fed. Credit Union v. Parker (In re Parker), 139 F.3d
668, 672-73 (9th Cir. 1998) (permitting "installment redemption" but recog-
nizing a sharp split among the circuits on this issue); Lowry Fed. Credit Union
v. West (In re Lowry), 882 F.2d 1543, 1546 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that
debtor's failure to redeem or reaffirm debt did not give secured creditor auto-
matic right to repossess collateral).
47. See Johnson v. Sun Fin. Co. (In re Johnson), 89 F.3d 249, 252 (5th Cir.
1996); Taylor v. AGE Fed. Credit Union (In re Taylor), 3 F.3d 1512, 1516-17
(1 lth Cir. 1993).
48. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 105-794, at 23.
49. See id. at 22-23.
June 1999] 1005
LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLAWREVIEW [Vol. 32:977
the property, or a fractional interest in it, to a third party, who then
files a new bankruptcy petition. Sometimes, the original owner of
the property becomes the victim of the transferee, who files repeated
petitions and rents out the property to unsuspecting tenants while
pocketing the rent. Statistical studies indicate that many millions of
dollars in real property are tied up every year as the result of bank-
ruptcy foreclosure fraud.
Section 121 of H.R. 315050 and section 303 of S. 130151 con-
tained similar, but much more complex, provisions. A simpler,
stronger, and easier alternative was developed by the Bankruptcy
Foreclosure Scam Task Force of the United States Bankruptcy Court,
Central District of California, chaired by Judge Lisa Hill Fenning.
52
That Task Force included bankruptcy judges, representatives of con-
sumer groups, representatives of the United States Trustee's office,
the office of the United States Attorney, the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation, and representatives of mortgage lenders. 53 Section 120
of the Conference Report appears to have adopted the recommenda-
tions of the Task Force virtually verbatim; not surprisingly, I endorse
that approach. I do not want to repeat the material contained in the
Task Force Report, since it is published in this Symposium. To
summarize, though, section 120 authorizes relief from the stay based
upon a showing of fraud. 54 The resulting order, if recorded, would
mean that the filing of future bankruptcies within two years involv-
ing the property would not give rise to an automatic stay of foreclo-
sure. The debtor in the subsequent case or any other party to that
case, however, would have the right to seek the imposition of a stay
for cause shown.
50. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. § 121.
51. Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1997, S. 1301, 105th Cong. §
303.
52. See Honorable Lisa Hill Fenning et al., Final Report of the Bankruptcy
Foreclosure Scam Task Force (last modified June 25, 1998)
<http://www.abiworld.org/research/finalreportcdcalif_6_98.html>.
53. See id. The author of this article served as the Legislative Reporter for
that Task Force, but the report that ultimately emerged was primarily the work
of Judge Fenning.
54. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-794, at 22.
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XII. CONCLUSION
Like it or not, bankruptcy reform is on its way, in some form or
another. It will almost certainly include needs-based access to
Chapter 7. Practitioners, creditors, and the courts have a strong in-
centive to work together now to make sure that whatever emerges
from Washington will be practicable, fair, and sensible. Otherwise,
we are doomed to endure a time of chaos, followed by the inevitable
"technical amendments."
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